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Abstract: 
This is the first study that assesses the economic effects of supreme audit 
institutions (SAIs) on a cross country basis. Drawing on two distinct 
sources (a survey carried out by the International Organization of the SAIs 
in the early 90ies a nd an OECD/World Bank Survey of Budget Practices 
and Procedures carried out in 2003), the effects of SAIs on three groups of 
economic variables are estimated, namely on (1) fiscal policy, on (2) 
government effectiveness, and on (3) productivity. On the basis of up to 40 
countries, differences in the independence, the mandate, the 
implementation record, and the organizational model of the SAIs do not 
seem to have any clear-cut effect on any of the three groups of dependent 
variables. There is only one exception: perceived levels of corruption (an 
aspect of government  effectiveness) are significantly higher if the SAI is 
structured along the court model of auditing. Although in isolation the 
number of observations appears to be quite low, we argue that the results 
are unlikely to significantly change if the number of observations is 
increased for two reasons: the two surveys cover different sets of countries 
and the individual significance levels are usually extremely low indicating 
that the structure of SAIs could, indeed, be completely superfluous for the 
effectiveness of these organizations. 
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Supreme Audit Institutions: Supremely Superfluous? A Cross Country 
Assessment 
1 Introduction 
To carry out its policies effectively, government depends on scores of bureaucrats 
to implement government policies faithfully. Many states have attempted to 
mitigate the underlying principal agent problem by creating Supreme Audit 
Institutions (SAIs) who are to audit the legality but often also the efficiency and 
even the effectiveness of the spending behavior of many government bureaus. A 
paper published by the World Bank (2001) claims that SAIs are “useful in 
managing public spending, ensuring financial accountability, and strengthening 
public institutions.”  Some SAIs pride themselves with their long history: the 
Chinese SAI, e.g., traces auditing supervision back to the Western Zhou Dynasty 
that reigned China some 3000 years ago 
(www.cnao.gov.cn/main/articleshor_artID_725.htm). Almost all  countries do 
have a SAI: INTOSAI, the International Organization of Supreme Audit 
Institutions, has more than 170 members. Many SAIs are sizeable government 
bureaus themselves. The US Government Accountability office, e.g., employs 
3200 and prides itself with having generated 39.6 billion in measurable financial 
benefits or “an $83 return on every dollar invested in GAO” (GAO at a glance, 
found on:  www.gao.gov/about/gglance.html). The aggregate number of 
employees among the approximately 60 countries that participated in the 
INTOSAI survey from the early 90ies was 124.000.2 In sum, SAIs have a long 
history, are government agencies of a substantial size, and claim to generate 
substantial positive effects. Yet, the economic effects of SAIs have never been 
systematically assessed on a cross country basis. 
If SAIs function effectively, they could indeed have far-reaching consequences: 
they could affect (i) fiscal policy as government expenditure could be lower which 
could also affect both government revenue and deficit levels. SAIs could further 
have an influence on (ii) government effectiveness: monitoring the spending 
behavior of government bureaus might decrease (perceived) corruption levels as 
well as increase government effectiveness on a more general level. Eventually, 
they could even improve (iii) the general productivity of resources used in the 
economy by improving both labor and total factor productivity. In their book-
length study on the economic effects of constitutions, Persson and Tabellini 
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(2003) have analyzed the effects of constitutional institutions on exactly these 
variables. In a sense, our study can thus be read as an extension of their work. 
This is even true in a literal sense: many constitutions do mention SAIs explicitly, 
they can hence also be termed a constitutional institution in the sense that they are 
explicitly mentioned in the constitution. At the same time, we rely both on the 
estimation approach as well as on many of the variables used by Persson and 
Tabellini. 
Up till now, the  – very small  – available empirical literature has focused on 
analyzing the effects of SAIs across Swiss cantons. Schelker and Eichenberger 
(2003) find that stronger audit institutions lead to lower tax burdens and 
expenditures. In Schelker and Eichenberger (2004), the authors posit that stronger 
audit institutions lead to lower tax rates. Torgler (2005) finds that a more 
encompassing mandate of SAIs increases tax morale. Torgler and Schaltegger 
(2006)  find that strong audit institutions are one significant variable in 
determining the level of political discussion among cantons. In sum, all of these 
studies find that the mandate of SAIs in Swiss cantons has a number of significant 
empirical effects. 
This is the first paper that tries to assess the effects of SAIs on a cross country 
basis and we are, of course, interested to know whether the results found for Swiss 
cantons can be generalized. Two data-sets (covering different countries) are used 
to assess whether differences in the organizational structure of SAIs can be shown 
to have economic effects. The empirical estimates are, however, quite sobering: as 
the title of the paper already indicates, the variables used to proxy for the 
independence, mandate, transparency and the stylized model of the SAIs do not 
display any significant impact on almost all of the economic variables just 
discussed. There is, however, one noteworthy exception: the variable proxying for 
the model on which the SAI is based is significantly (and robustly) correlated with 
the absence of graft in government. If the SAI is structured like a court, graft is 
more than one point higher (on a 1-10 scale) than in other countries, c.p.. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section introduces the 
underlying monitoring problem theoretically. Section three deals with the 
potential relevance of institutional details of SAIs, in section four, the data 
underlying our regressions are presented and the estimation approach is described. 
Section five contains the results, section six concludes.   4 
2 Some Theory 
The output of government bureaus is notoriously difficult to evaluate. Since we 
are dealing with public goods, prices as the outcome of a competitive process are 
typically absent. Following Niskanen (1971), the economic theory of bureaucracy 
has identified a number of additional reasons for the difficulty to evaluate the 
activities of bureaus: First, the bureau does often not even supply output units as 
such, but rather levels of activities from which output levels must be inferred 
(ibid., 24-6). Secondly, monitoring bureaucratic behavior is difficult because it is 
often part of a bilateral monopoly (between the bureau and the executive) which is 
not subject to competitive pressure that could enhance the bureau’s efficiency. 
Thirdly, inefficiency will be further increased by the way bureaucrats are usually 
paid: typically, their wages do not contain any (monetary) incentives that reward 
innovative or simply efficient behavior. Mueller (2003, 363) summarizes: “Thus, 
the public bureau is characterized by weak external control on efficiency and 
weak internal incentives.” Based on these observations, various approaches 
modelling the behavior of bureaucrats have been published: The one by Niskanen 
modelled the bureaucrat as a budget-maximizing actor, later ones perceived him 
as slack-maximizing (Migué and Bélanger 1974) or risk-avoiding (Peltzmann 
1973; Mueller 2003, ch. 16 contains an excellent overview). All models have in 
common that they explain why it is unlikely to expect a bureau to provide the 
optimal amount of the public good in an efficient manner. 
Given that more standard monitoring mechanisms are unlikely to function – or are 
even impossible to use -, it seems natural to ask whether SAIs can fill at least part 
of the gap. The role of the U.K.’s National Audit Office (NAO) can serve as an 
example for the role of most SAIs, although their mandates as well as the 
addressees of their reports differ widely. The role of the NAO is “to audit the 
accounts of all government departments and agencies as well as a wide range of 
other public bodies, and report to Parliament on the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness with which government bodies have used public money.” The 
website of the NAO continues: “Our work saves the taxpayer millions of pounds 
every year.” (both cites from: http://www.nao.org.uk/). That this statement could 
be true seems at least very plausible: in many highly developed countries, state 
consumption is around half the entire national product. It seems highly likely that 
the efficiency of the public sector has a potentially huge impact on growth and per 
capita income. 
What could possible transmission mechanisms between SAIs and our economic 
variables look like? The first group of economic variables we are interested in are 
fiscal policy variables. If SAIs have the competence to evaluate both the   5 
efficiency and the effectiveness with which government bodies use public money, 
this could make bureaucrats spend less money which could mean that government 
expenditure should, c.p., be lower. Similarly, the auditing activities of SAIs could 
also result in lower tax revenues: because government bodies work more 
effectively, fewer resources are needed to provide the same amount of public 
goods which would, c.p., mean that lower tax  rates are necessary. Thirdly, and 
again closely related, SAIs could lead to lower government deficits. 
The second group of dependent variables we are interested in reflect government 
efficiency. If it is part of the SAIs mandate to audit the efficiency of many 
government bodies, then – supposing the effectiveness of SAIs – this should be 
reflected in general indicators for government efficiency. A bit more specifically, 
the auditing activity of SAIs could make it more risky, and hence less 
advantageous, for bureaucrats to engage in corrupt behavior. If this were the case, 
(perceived) rates of corruption should be lower. 
The third, and last, group of dependent variables to be used here are proxies of 
productivity. One way to view public goods is to claim that their provision is a 
precondition for the production of private goods. The more efficient the provision 
of public goods, the higher can both labor and total factor productivity hence 
expected to be. 
These conjectures paint a fairly optimistic view of the possibility of SAIs not only 
to monitor the behavior of many government bodies but also to contribute 
substantially to the improvement of their behavior. Such an optimistic view might, 
however, be premature.  
Before simply assuming auditors to be effective monitors, a look at their 
incentives is in order. The relationship between the population and the 
administration to be audited can be thought of as a triple principal-agent problem: 
on the first level, the population is the principal and the legislature its agent. On 
the second level, the legislature assumes the role of principal and the executive 
becomes the agent. On the third level, the executive can be interpreted as the 
principal, and the bureaucracy as its agent. On three levels, there is asymmetric 
information between the principal and the agent, and the principal is incapable of 
monitoring the agent costlessly. Following the lines of this conceptualization, a 
SAI can be conceived of as a monitoring organization for three different 
principals; namely (1) the electorate, (2) the legislature and (3) the executive. We 
will see later that most SAIs can be thought of as monitoring organizations of 
either the legislature or the executive.   6 
No matter what model is chosen, creating a SAI as a monitor always creates an 
additional principal-agent problem: that between the respective principal and the 
SAI as its agent. Streim (1994, 184) observes: “Thus the question arises whether 
there are incentives that motivate the chief auditor and his staff to work hard – that 
means to deliver audit services of high quality.” Creating yet another auditor to 
monitor the behavior of the SAI leads to an infinite regress. 
In order to predict the possible consequences of SAIs, it seems thus important to 
inquire into the incentives of the respective principals to set up an effective 
monitoring organization and the incentives of the respective SAI to deliver results. 
Regarding the incentives of the potential principals, two observations: (1) the 
population at large is not able to overcome the collective action problem which 
makes it, hence, highly unlikely that it will ever become more than a “virtual” 
principal. (2) It might be mistaken to assume that legislatures have incentives to 
control executives as many pork barrel projects require the cooperation with the 
executive. This argument might be less convincing with regard to presidential - as 
opposed to parliamentary - systems as legislature and executive are less closely 
intertwined in presidential systems. The form of government thus needs to be 
included as a control variable. 
This leads us directly to consider the incentives of the SAIs. From principal-agent 
theory, we know that multitasking has predictable consequences: the agency that 
is assigned multiple tasks will spend most of its efforts in monitoring those tasks 
that are comparatively easy to monitor. With regard to empirics, this means that 
one should control for the breadth of monitoring tasks allocated to a SAI. Other 
considerations dealing with SAI incentives include the following: (i) Are monitors 
awarded monetary incentives? If they receive, e.g. a fixed portion of public 
expenditure saved due to their monitoring, this would create incentives to 
concentrate on the most important inefficiencies. (ii) D o monitors have 
‘competitors’, i.e. other actors who have an own interest in uncovering 
government inefficiencies? These could be NGOs, the media and so forth. Given 
that there are such competitors, we would predict the SAIs to be more active, c.p.. 
In an early analysis of SAIs, Frey (1994) was very critical concerning their 
incentives and suggested the following arguments: 
•  Members of SAIs are bureaucrats themselves; they would hence t ake 
recourse to bureaucratic solutions such as even more regulation. Making 
other bureaus follow bureaucratic rules more closely might even increase 
inefficiency and constitute an additional source of waste.   7 
•  Members of SAIs tend to neglect non-budgetary  costs of bureaucratic 
behavior. The concept of opportunity costs seems to be unknown among 
accountants. 
•  Members of SAIs report with great precision on minor deviations from 
administrative rationality; while often not reporting on major inefficiencies. 
A  major German public finance text book (Blankart 2006, 540ff.) is even more 
critical with regard to SAIs: 
  •  Members of SAIs can comment upon the behavior of government 
bodies but do not have any formal veto power to block expenses. 
  •  The burden of proof concerning inefficient bureaucratic conduct is with 
the SAIs. As they are outsiders, inefficiency will be difficult to prove. 
  •  Members of SAIs are bureaucrats themselves; SAIs are monopolists of 
their own, since competition between SAIs seems to be a rare exception. 
  •  Most publications of SAIs report on wasteful behavior that occurred 
months or even years ago; the public is usually not very interested in this 
kind of information. 
  •  Members of SAIs might enjoy independence, but they do not have any 
judicial power in the sense of being able to formally sanction wasteful 
behavior of bureaucrats. 
Adequate incentives of the SAI are, however, only a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition of its having effects on the three groups of variables described above. 
Additionally, the executive needs incentives to improve its effectiveness as a 
consequence of audit reports. Here again, we encounter more than one reason to 
be skeptical:  
Most SAIs audit the behavior of government bodies only ex post facto. Hence, the 
question arises whether government bodies have any incentives to change their 
behavior in future periods as a consequence of SAI reports. This will supposedly 
depend on a number of factors, some of them inherent in the institutional details 
of the SAIs, others rather on the institutional environment. If SAI reports are, for 
example, not published, their likelihood of inducing bureaucrats to change their 
behavior appears rather low. Suppose that SAI reports are regularly published. 
Their impact could then depend on the degree of press freedom realized in a given   8 
country. Published reports that are nowhere reported in the mass media are 
conjectured to be less likely to induce change in the behavior of bureaucrats.3 
Based on these arguments, it would be hard to believe that SAIs should have 
many discernible positive economic effects. Yet, this critique might be premature: 
to the degree that institutions have been created to which these arguments do not 
apply, they might have positive effects. E.g., in some jurisdictions, members of 
SAIs do not only enjoy independence but also have the power to impose sanctions 
on inefficient bureaucrats. In the next section of the paper, we will, hence, have a 
closer look at institutional details that are potentially relevant. 
3 The Possible Relevance of Institutional Details 
The theoretical section has shown that SAIs might very well not have any 
substantial economic consequences. If they were to have any, these would hinge 
on institutional details. Some potentially relevant institutional details are, hence, 
discussed in this section. 
(1) The mandate of the SAI could have a significant effect on the behavior of its 
representatives. Three types are conventionally distinguished, namely (i) financial 
auditing in which the auditor assesses the accuracy and fairness of the financial 
statements of a government body; (ii) compliance auditing in which the auditor 
checks whether both revenue and spending have been authorized as well as spent 
on approved purposes, and (iii) performance or value-for-money auditing in which 
the auditor checks whether the citizens have received value for their money. 
Within value-for-money auditing, one can distinguish between evaluations of 
efficiency and effectiveness (World Bank 2001). 
Other aspects of the mandate of SAIs include the following: 
-  Is the mandate confined to ex post auditing or does it also extend to ex ante 
auditing? At least theoretically, the mandate to audit ex ante could prevent 
many cases from wasteful spending entirely. If not only an ex ante vote but an 
ex ante approval by the SAI is required, this amounts to giving it veto powers. 
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-  Once the SAI has produced its report, is the report made available in its 
entirety to the public? The likelihood that government bodies will change their 
behavior due to public scrutiny seems to be higher than if the report remains a 
secret government document. 
-  Does the SAI have the competence to sanction representatives of government 
bodies for an improper handling of public money? The mere threat of being 
sanctioned could be sufficient to induce proper behavior. 
(2) The independence of the SAI could also be crucial. Independence, broadly 
conceived, would include independence both from the addressee of the report as 
well as from the government body to be audited. The degree of independence will 
be determined by the following institutional details: 
-  Authority to receive all information deemed necessary for a proper audit; if 
auditors cannot get the information they believe they need to audit a 
government body properly, this will decrease the quality of their report. 
-  Term length of auditors; possibility/necessity to renew their terms; the longer 
their term, the more independent auditors would, c.p., appear to be.4 If their 
terms need renewal, this would, on the other hand, make them more likely to 
cater to the interests of those who have the power to re-appoint them. 
-  Appointment procedure of auditors; if government members can choose 
auditors who are old buddies, effective auditing appears to be less likely. 
-  Provisions for removal of auditors; if government members who dislike the 
findings of SAIs can easily get rid off them, this would be inimical to their 
independence – and the effectiveness of their reports. 
-  Remuneration of auditors; this will determine the quality of staff the SAI is 
able to attract. 
-  Budget of SAI; this will determine the effectiveness as possibilities to receive 
training in more advanced methods, to keep up with recent literature etc. all 
depend on an adequate budget of the SAI. 
-  Mandate and terms of independence guaranteed constitutionally? The 
constitution is usually more difficult to change than ordinary law. 
Constitutional guarantees should, hence, make the promised independence of 
auditors more credible. 
(3) The institutional environment of SAIs might play an important role, too. Take, 
e.g., the case in which reports of the SAI are published but press freedom is low 
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such that the press is not free to publish the insights freely. Should the SAI have 
identified cases in which government bodies did not spend public money properly 
and the SAI does not have the competence to sanction wrong-doers itself, 
factually independent prosecutors as well as factually independent courts seem to 
be a precondition for the SAI’s report to have any effects. Further potentially 
important aspects include: 
-  is the state a federal state with more than a single SAI? Two effects of having 
more than one SAI appear plausible: on the one hand, a certain degree of 
competition between the SAIs could be the result. This should, hence, increase 
the quality of their reports. On the other hand, a variant of the volunteer’s 
dilemma could also dominate: if the members of SAIs are assumed not to 
derive any utility from working, they might hope that other SAIs might move 
first and audit a certain government body. 
-  Over the last number of years, a number of institutions and organizations have 
been created in many states that seem to complement SAIs. Freedom of 
Information Acts can increase the transparency of the bureaucracy, regulatory 
impact assessment is a different route towards ascertaining benefits and costs 
of regulatory measures, ombudspersons can be an alternative entry of citizens 
into having the adequacy of administrative behavior checked, Anti-Corruption 
Agencies can, if successful, r educe the degree of corruption present in 
government bodies etc. It appears likely that the presence of such 
organizations could be complementary to SAIs. Their presence is, hence, 
expected to improve economic outcomes. 
-  The literature has been proposing competition between state auditors and 
private auditors. The underlying rationale is, of course, to give state auditors 
incentives to do a good job. 
-  Finally, civil society organizations might be instrumental in getting the 
message of the SAI reports across: active NGOs who aim at improving the 
efficiency of the public sector might play an important role here. 
The possible relevance of the institutional environment reminds us that it might 
not be the existence of SAIs in isolation that matters but SAIs in conjunction with 
other institutions or organizations. To the degree that reliable information is 
available on the aspects just proposed, these will have to be taken into account 
into the estimation approach. 
These are quite a few criteria. If they could be combined arbitrarily, the number of 
possible organizational structures would be immense. A straightforward question 
thus is whether there are any typical patterns, combinations of characteristics that   11 
appear time and again. This is, indeed, the case. The literature on SAIs generally 
stresses the existence of three different models of auditing (World Bank 2001, 
more details in Department for International Development 2004): (1) the 
Napoleonic system, (2) the Westminster System, and (3) the board system. 
In the  Napoleonic or Judicial Model, the SAI is part of the judiciary, hence 
independent from both legislature and executive. The Court of Accounts has the 
competence to impose penalties where illegal transactions are found. Wrongdoers 
are usually held personally liable and imposed with penalties. Since the Court 
members are judges, they usually enjoy unlimited terms (until a fixed retirement 
age). In some countries such as Italy, Portugal and Brazil, the SAI has also an ex 
ante control function. Since the primary focus is on legal issues, questions of 
efficiency and effectiveness play often only a minor role. The lack of 
parliamentary involvement can result in little public scrutiny and debate (DFID 
2004). 
In the Westminster Model, the SAI reports to a Public Accounts Committee 
(PAC), which issues a report of its own to which the government needs to 
respond. Traditionally, the chairperson of the PAC is an opposition member. The 
staff usually have a financial background, they are often accountants and auditors. 
The focus in this model is much more on financial aspects than in the Napoleonic 
Model. 
The Collegiate or Board Model is similar to the Westminster model in that 
Parliament is its main addressee. The main difference is that it is not headed by a 
single person but by a board (that may, in turn, have its own chairperson). This 
can be both an advantage and a disadvantage: the outcome of its work is not so 
much dependent on a single person, on the other hand, the collegiate structure can 
make decision making cumbersome and slow. 
The Napoleonic Model is most frequently applied in countries with a French legal 
origin, the Westminster Model in countries with a common law legal origin. There 
is, however, no perfect fit between the two: both Chile and Peru that are 
conventionally grouped to have a French legal origin, follow the Westminster 
Model. 
4 Data Description and Estimation Approach 
The estimation approach used is straightforward and follows directly from the 
theoretical part. We are interested in estimating the dependent variable Y that can 
stand for (i) fiscal policy, (ii) government effectiveness or (iii) economic   12 
productivity of a country. The vector M is made up of a number of standard 
variables conventionally used to explain Y. The variable SAI is our measure of 
Supreme Audit Institutions and the Z vector is composed of a number of control 
variables that can be both economic as well as institutional. 
                                      Yi = ai + ßMi + ?SAIi + dZi + ei 
For the dependent variable Y, we largely draw on the data used by Persson and 
Tabellini (2003). In order to capture the effects of institutions on fiscal policy, the 
following variables are used: 
-  Central government spending (social security included) as a percentage of 
GDP (CGEXP);5 
-  The size of the budget surplus of the central government as a percentage of 
GDP (SPL). 
To operationalize for government effectiveness, we rely on the following 
indicators: 
-  The average of the  Corruption Perception Index as produced by 
Transparency International for the years 2000 to 2004 (recoded such that 0 
stands for perfectly clean and 10 for highly corrupt; CPI0004);6 
-  A cluster of the governance indicators produced by Kaufmann et al. (2002) 
from the World Bank called government effectiveness. It is to combine 
perceptions of quality of public service provision, the quality of a country’s 
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, and their independence from 
political pressures (GOVEF). 
Finally, the variable used for total factor productivity is an updated version of the 
one presented by Hall and Jones (1999; LOGA). Their calculations were for 1988, 
we recalculated them for the year 2000.7 The M-vector changes subject to the 
specific dependent variable. This is why we describe the vector in conjunction 
with the specific tests. 
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To produce the variables contained in the SAI vector, we draw on two different 
data sets. The first relies on a survey on Budget Practices and Procedures that was 
carried out by the World Bank in conjunction with the OECD in 2003. One part of 
this survey dealt with external audit systems. Answers are available for up to 44 
countries, most of them OECD members but also countries from Latin America 
(Argentina, Bolivia,  Chile, Peru, Uruguay), Central and Eastern Europe 
(Slovenia), the Middle East and Northern Africa (Algeria, Jordan, Morocco), 
Africa (Kenya, South Africa), and Asia (Indonesia). The other source is a survey 
carried out by INTOSAI among member organizations in the first half of the 90ies 
which contains up to 60 countries. The countries coded are a lot more 
heterogeneous in terms of per capita income  than those covered in the World 
Bank/OECD survey (see table 1 for descriptive statistics and appendix 2 for a list 
of all countries contained in either of the two surveys, for which the data from 
Persson and Tabellini 2003 was also available). Since the two surveys cover 
different countries, similar sizes in the estimated coefficients can already be 
interpreted as a kind of robustness test. 
The answers to the questions of the World Bank/OECD survey were coded and 
turned into five indicators for various aspects of SAIs. Each of the five variables 
can take on values between 0 and 1 where greater values indicate a broader 
mandate or a higher degree of independence. The coding of the variables is 
documented in more detail in appendix 1, appendix 2 contains the variable values 
for all countries. 
The first variable deals with the independence of SAIs (and is henceforth referred 
to as IND): Does a formal external audit of governments exist at all (the country 
was coded 0 if that was not the case) and if yes, does it report to the legislature or 
the executive? Coding relied on the hypothesis that both independence and 
distance from the executive (as opposed to the legislature) was desirable. This 
variable gives first hints concerning the de jure independence of SAIs. 
The second variable focuses on the mandate of SAIs (MAND). The questionnaire 
contained four potentially complementary answers plus the option to specify 
additional aspects of the mandate (attestation of financial accountability of 
individual agencies; attestation of financial accountability of the government as a 
whole; audit of financial systems, internal control, and audit functions; mandate 
covering performance as well as financial compliance). The coding was based on 
the hypothesis that the more encompassing the mandate, the better. For every 
option ticked, the country received a score of 0.2.   14 
The third variable is concerned with another aspect of the mandate, namely the 
question to what degree the recommendations of the SAI are implemented. If no 
system of keeping track of the implementation record existed, this country was 
coded 0. If there was a fully fledged tracking system, the country was coded 1. 
Two intermediate options were, accordingly, coded 0.33 and 0.67 (TRAC). 
The institutional arrangements (ARR) for securing the independence of SAIs are 
reflected in variable four. All countries have clear legal foundations for their 
SAIs. In a little less than half of the participating countries, the independence of 
their SAI is established by law, in a little more than half of them, it is established 
in the constitution. 
The next variable asks how the subjects of audits are determined (SUBJ). The 
questionnaire offered, again, four answers that are not mutually exclusive 
(legislative request, internally determined, executive request, by request from the 
public or other civil society actor). An open, fifth, option could also be ticked. 
Again, every option ticked gained the country 0.2 for a maximum of 1. 
The survey conducted by INTOSAI contained almost one hundred questions. In 
order to reduce the number of potentially relevant explanatory variables, a factor 
analysis  was carried out which produced  two principle components with an 
eigenvalue of 4 and greater. These two components alone explain almost one third 
of the variance in the original data. The variable with the highest factor loading on 
the first principle component is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the 
agency is at least partially organized like a court (and is, hence, grouped as 
“Napoleonic”) and 0 otherwise. We call it MOD further on. The variable with the 
highest factor loading on the second principle component  is a measure of the 
human resources that the agency can rely on, namely the number of employees 
per 100 000 inhabitants.  Based on the assumption that factual independence 
presupposes manpower this variable is called  FIND further on. The o ther 
variables in the INTOSAI data set did not produce any significant results beyond 
those based on the World Bank / OECD survey and are not reported here.8 
                                                 
8   This is also true for two variables of the World Bank / OECD survey itself: namely the issue of 
whether the findings of SAIs are available to the public, and whether the results are circulated and 
discussed in Parliament. The results are, however, available upon request.   15 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the 7 SAI Variables* 
Variable  Min  Max  Mean  St.-dev.  Source  N 
IND  0.25  1.00  0.92  0.18  WB/OECD  32 
MAND  0.20  1.00  0.64  0.25  WB/OECD  33 
TRAC  0.00  1.00  0.69  0.36  WB/OECD  29 
ARR  0.67  1.00  0.85  0.16  WB/OECD  32 
SUBJ  0.20  1.00  0.45  0.25  WB/OECD  31 
FIND  0.00  19.57  4.74  4.99  INTOSAI  39 
MOD  0.00  1.00  0.28  0.45  INTOSAI  40 
 
* Confined to those countries that are also included in the dataset provided by Persson and Tabellini 2003. 
 
These indicators are, of course, not ideal as proxies for the criteria named in 
sections 2 and 3. Some of the criteria are explicitly dealt with (e.g. whether the 
mandate of the SAI is based on the constitution or on ordinary law, whether the 
reports of the SAI are publicly available), others remain completely uncovered 
(e.g. whether the mandate includes value-for-money auditing, whether the SAI 
can become active ex ante, or whether members of the SAI have the competence 
to sanction bureaucrats). Yet, these seven indicators cover various relevant aspects 
of the mandate and the independence of SAIs.9 A potentially more serious 
problem regarding these indicators is that they overwhelmingly report the legal 
situation of the SAIs. To the degree that the factual situation deviates from the 
legal institutions, this will hence not be sufficiently reflected in the estimates.10 
The only exception is the variable capturing the human resource endowment of 
SAIs, which is, however, only one of a number of potentially relevant aspects. 
We now turn to discuss a number of control variables. Their inclusion is also an 
attempt to recognize the potential relevance of the institutional environment as 
discussed in the last section. There, it was argued that the publication of audit 
reports might remain without effects, if there is no free press that could widely 
disseminate the findings of these reports. The variable used for press freedom is 
taken from Freedom House here and higher values indicate a lower degree of 
                                                 
9   It is noteworthy that only the bivariate correlations between ARR and SUBJ as well as between 
MOD and SUBJ are significant on the ten percent level (r = -0.401; -0.447). All other bivariate 
correlations turn out to be insignificant. This is why we refrain from presenting an overall index 
containing all the single variables here. We did create such an indicator which does, however, not 
lead to more significant results than the ones presented here. 
10   In a study dealing with the effects of judicial independence on economic growth, it turned out that 
de jure judicial independence was largely insignificant for explaining growth, whereas de facto judicial 
independence was highly significant (both statistically and economically) as well as very robust (Feld 
and Voigt 2003).    16 
press freedom. It is plausible to assume that SAIs will only have significant 
economic effects given a high level of press freedom. This will be taken into 
account by including an interaction effect between the SAI variable and press 
freedom. 
Suppose, however, that the report of the SAI is published and its contents widely 
disseminated by a free press. Whether the bureaucrats have incentives to change 
their behavior will inter alia depend on the likelihood that they will be sanctioned 
by members of the government. This likelihood will, in turn, depend on the 
probability that voters will vote governments that do not strive to increase 
bureaucratic efficiency out of  office. One possibly relevant factor could be the 
intensity of competition for office. The higher its intensity, the more likely it 
seems that audit reports will provoke efficiency enhancing effects. The variable 
“intensity of party competition” is taken f rom the Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck et al. 2000, FRAC). Alternatively, we propose to control for the 
degree of democracy realized in a country. Polity IV offers an 
autocracy/democracy measure that can take on values between  –10 (complete 
autocracy) to +10 (complete democracy). The prediction is that higher degrees of 
democracy make it more likely that SAIs will have significant economic effects. 
Hence, interaction terms need to be estimated. 
Further, federal states often have more than one SAI, which could lead to 
competition between them (and strengthen the expected impact) but also to the 
volunteers’ dilemma (and weaken the expected impact). No clear-cut prediction 
concerning the expected sign is, hence, possible and we propose to let the data 
speak. 
A related variable is the degree of independence that both the courts and the 
prosecutors enjoy. Suppose that a SAI report points out a number of examples for 
the illegal behavior by bureaucrats. It seems straightforward to assume that these 
will be prosecuted and sanctioned if found guilty. This reasoning presupposes, 
however, both independent prosecutors and independent judges. From previous 
research (Feld and Voigt 2003, Voigt et al. 2006) we know, however, that this 
cannot be taken for granted. Hence, both de facto JI and de facto PI are included 
as control variables. Additionally, both variables are interacted with our indicators 
for SAIs.   17 
5 Estimation Results 
The relevance of SAIs for Government Expenditure 
Following Persson and Tabellini (2003), the M-vector used to explain variation in 
central government expenditure is made up of (1) per capita income in log form 
for the period between 1992 and 1998 (LYP), (2) the openness of a country 
measured as the sum of exports plus imports of goods and services as a share of 
GDP (TRADE), (3) the proportion of the population over the age of 65 
(PROP65), and (4) an average of political rights and civil liberties (with lower 
values indicating better situations) (GASTIL). These four variables “explain” 
already half of the variation in central government expenditure. In columns (2) 
through (8), seven variables proxying for various institutional and organizational 
aspects of SAIs are added to the M -vector. Only one of the seven variables 
(SUBJ) gets close to reaching conventional levels of significance. But it is not 
robust to the inclusion of controls via the Z-vector (e.g. judicial independence; not 
reported in table). The first result to note is that differences in institutional and 
organizational structures of SAIs do not seem to display a significant impact on 
central government expenditure. 
The relevance of SAIs for Budget Deficits 
We now ask whether the institutional structure of SAIs has any discernible 
consequences for the size of the budget surplus or deficit. The M-vector is slightly 
modified now. Here, the openness variable is dropped and a dummy-variable for 
OECD-membership is introduced instead. The model only explains some 25 
percent of the variation in budget deficits and the significance of the single 
variables fluctuates substantially across equations. Regarding the SAI-variables, 
the indicator for the mandate of the SAI is significant on the 5 percent level. 
However, it has an – unexpected – negative sign indicating that higher values of 
the mandate variable are correlated with lower levels of budget surplus (or, 
equivalently, with higher levels of budget deficit).   18 
Table 2: SAIs and Central Government Expenditures (OLS Regressions)11 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Variables 
WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  INTOSAI  INTOSAI  INTOSAI 








































































IND    4.832 
(0.703) 
             
MAND      -3.439 
(0.520) 
           
TRAC        1.662 
(0.439)           
ARR          -3.031 
(0.323) 
       
SUBJ            -9.079 
(1.714) 
     
FIND                -0.372 
(1.535)   
MOD                  -0.474 
(0.170) 
Constant  23.473  30.755  20.019  40.271  22.652  61.255  55.622  69.899  55.101 
2 R   0.661  0.631  0.655  0.638  0.649  0.641  0.489  0.491  0.474 
SER  6.527  6.840  6.592  6.773  6.709  6.592  7.029  6.812  7.129 
JB  2.234  1.501  1.957  1.585  1.593  0.765  1.113  0.896  1.061 
N  33  31  33  29  32  31  40  39  40 
The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics, based on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘(*)’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level. SER is the standard error of the 
regression, and JB the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. 
                                                 
11   Remember that columns 1 through 6 on the one hand, and 7 through 9 on the other represent two 
largely different samples. Since none of the SAI variables reaches a conventional significance level, 
we refrain from adjusting the number of observations across columns. This can already be 
interpreted as a somewhat unusual robustness test of our results.   19 
Table 3: SAIs and Budget Surplus (OLS Regressions) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Variables 
WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  INTOSAI  INTOSAI  INTOSAI 








































































IND    -1.427 
(0.728) 
             
MAND      -4.094* 
(2.296)             
TRAC        0.082 
(0.063) 
         
ARR          0.673 
(0.221) 
       
SUBJ            1.543 
(0.553)       
FIND                0.126 
(0.934) 
 
MOD                  -1.670 
(1.317) 
Constant  -9.209  -11.119  -19.570  -8.276  -9.404  -15.431  -31.433  -33.902  -31.486 
2 R   0.133  0.017  0.238  0.008  0.101  0.078  0.264  0.255  0.283 
SER  2.333  2.414  2.187  2.549  2.375  2.434  3.252  3.236  3.209 
JB  0.679  0.326  2.419  0.722  0.586  0.487  0.261  0.012  0.758 
N  32  30  32  28  32  30  39  38  39 
The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics, based on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘(*)’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level. SER is the standard error of the 
regression, and JB the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. 
In sum, the institutional and organizational structure of SAIs does not seem to 
have a significant impact either on government expenditure or on budget deficits. 
We hence move on to deal with two indicators of government efficiency and 
begin with the impact of SAIs on (perceived) corruption levels. 
The relevance of SAIs for (perceived) corruption 
There is no objective way to measure the degree of corruption present i n an 
economy. Ever since 1995, the NGO Transparency International has distributed 
an indicator for perceived corruption levels that is, itself, based on up to twelve 
different surveys. The so-called “Corruption Perception Index” is widely used in 
empirical work. Here, it is the average of the CPI for the years 2000 until 2004   20 
that is used as the dependent variable. The indicator is recoded such that lower 
levels indicate lower levels of corruption. 
Previous studies have identified per capita income (LYP), a  mixture of both 
political freedom and civil liberties (GASTIL), a low degree in the ethno-
linguistic fractionalization of the population (AVELF), and the protestant share of 
the population (PROT80) as the main driving forces explaining the absence of 
corruption (see, e.g., Treisman 2000). These variables constitute the M-vector and 
explain already some three quarters of the observed variation in corruption rates 
across countries. None of the variables based on the World Bank / OECD-survey 
has any significant impact here. In contrast, one of the two variables taken from 
the INTOSAI is quite significant: if a SAI is modeled like a court, the country is 
more likely to suffer from higher levels of corruption than if the country’s SAI is 
not modeled like a court. This result is both very significant and quite robust since 
it never vanishes when adding the available control variables.12  
This result is not in line with our intuitions. According to them, the primary focus 
of the Court model on issues of legality should lead to lower rather than higher 
corruption.13 One plausible explanation is the relative lack of parliamentary 
involvement in the auditing process under the court model (DFID 2004, 8). The 
relative seclusion of the process makes it less transparent for the public, its results 
will often not lead to public outcry, and the expected utility of being corrupt is 
high as the likelihood or being sanctioned by a furious public is correspondingly 
low. 
This result can be interpreted as a first sign that the organizational structure of 
SAIs does have some significance on the variables that we are interested in. SAIs 
with a court-like structure are significantly less likely to go along with lower 
perceived levels of corruption than SAIs organized along different lines. 
                                                 
12   It also remains robust after controlling for legal origins. This is noteworthy because there is a 
positive correlation between French legal origins and the court model of SAIs (r = 0.365). 
13   Correspondingly, one should expect court model SAIs to be rather weak on the 
efficiency/effectiveness side. The results on budget surplus offer some confirmation as the dummy 
MOD has a negative sign and is significant on the ten percent level in a one-sided test. Countries 
following the court model seem, hence, to have chosen the worst of two worlds.   21 
Table 4: SAIs and (Perceived) Corruption Levels (OLS Regressions) 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Variables 
WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  INTOSAI  INTOSAI  INTOSAI 








































































IND    -0.847 
(1.302) 
             
MAND      0.153 
(0.202)             
TRAC        -0.260 
(0.356) 
         
ARR          0.340 
(0.253) 
       
SUBJ            0.526 
(0.412)       
FIND                -0.025 
(0.698) 
 
MOD                  1.178** 
(3.060) 
Constant  16.233  18.238  16.366  14.502  15.857  14.435  19.768  20.811  18.254 
2 R   0.782  0.816  0.774  0.772  0.767  0.755  0.780  0.804  0.822 
SER  1.062  1.007  1.081  1.102  1.086  1.107  1.154  1.095  1.040 
JB  0.088  0.366  0.091  0.124  0.021  0.022  0.667  2.197  0.337 
N  33  31  33  29  32  31  35  34  35 
The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics, based on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘(*)’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level. SER is the standard error of the 
regression, and JB the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. 
As yet another robustness check we turn away from the CPI and draw on the 
indicator on government effectiveness instead. 
The relevance of SAIs for Government Effectiveness 
This more encompassing variable has been constructed by Kaufmann and his co-
authors (Kaufmann et al. 2002). It combines perceptions of the quality of public 
service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, 
the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility 
of the government’s commitment to policies. As the dependent variable is similar 
to the one just used (the Corruption Perception Index), we also start out by using 
an identical M-Vector.   22 
Including the seven SAI variables one by one leads to a similar picture as with 
corruption perception levels: again, none of the five variables from the World 
Bank / OECD survey turns out to have any significant effect on the level of 
government effectiveness. This is also the case for the FIND variable from the 
INTOSAI survey. One reason for using this alternative measure of (the absence 
of) corruption was to check the robustness of the result obtained in table 4, namely 
that the model according to which SAIs are structured might be robustly 
correlated with corruption. As in the previous estimate, the variable MOD is again 
significant, but only on the ten percent level. As lower values correspond to better 
outcomes in the government effectiveness indicator, the coefficient means that 
countries whose SAI is structured along the court model are expected to do worse 
in terms of government effectiveness.  However, as soon as the factual 
independence of the judiciary (taken from Voigt et al. 2006) is controlled for, 
MOD is not significant any more. 
The relevance of SAIs for Total Factor Productivity 
We now move on to the last dependent variable, namely total factor productivity. 
We include into the M-vector a forecasted trade share which is based on a gravity 
model (FRANKROM because it is based on the approach of Frankel and Romer), 
the distance from the equator (LATITUDE), the proportion of the population who 
speaks English as their first language (ENGFRAC) and a dummy variable for 
federally organized states (FEDERAL). These four variables already “explain” 
about a third of the variation in total factor productivity. Adding the seven 
variables proxying for various features of SAIs reveals that none of them reaches 
conventional significance levels.  
   23 
Table 5: SAIs and Government Efficiency (OLS Regressions) 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Variables 
WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  INTOSAI  INTOSAI  INTOSAI 








































































IND    -0.316 
(1.184) 
             
MAND      0.259 
(0.541)             
TRAC        0.043 
(0.115) 
         
ARR          -0.466 
(0.606) 
       
SUBJ            0.367 
(0.570)       
FIND                -0.021 
(1.124) 
 
MOD                  0.559(*) 
(1.746) 
Constant  9.241  10.188  9.466  8.822  9.210  7.874  17.419  18.121  16.774 
2 R   0.803  0.824  0.798  0.805  0.795  0.801  0.779  0.786  0.792 
SER  0.605  0.590  0.613  0.620  0.604  0.596  0.834  0.832  0.811 
JB  4.533  5.362(*)  3.603  4.995  5.570(*)  8.161*  1.619  2.977  1.559 
N  33  31  33  29  32  31  39  38  39 
The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics, based on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘(*)’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level. SER is the standard error of the 
regression, and JB the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. 
   24 
Table 6: SAIs and Total Factor Productivity (OLS Regressions) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Variables 
WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  WBOECD  INTOSAI  INTOSAI  INTOSAI 








































































IND    0.154 
(0.870) 
             
MAND      -0.172 
(1.246)             
TRAC        -0.114 
(0.641) 
         
ARR          0.125 
(0.430) 
       
SUBJ            -0.112 
(0.538)       
FIND                -0.004 
(0.581) 
 
MOD                  0.152 
(1.546) 
Constant  0.333  0.190  0.406  0.403  0.208  0.400  0.227  0.157  0.061 
2 R   0.344  0.306  0.348  0.362  0.326  0.327  0.325  0.381  0.361 
SER  0.187  0.194  0.187  0.190  0.190  0.187  0.228  0.209  0.222 
JB  0.357  0.556  0.508  0.137  1.294  0.542  1.649  0.552  0.338 
N  31  29  31  27  31  29  39  38  39 
The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics, based on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘**’, 
‘*’ or ‘(*)’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level. SER is the standard error of the 
regression, and JB the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. 
6 Conclusions and Outlook 
This is the first study that analyzes the effects of Supreme Audit Institutions on a 
cross country basis. Two different surveys (one from the World Bank /OECD, the 
other one from INTOSAI) are used to generate a number of variables that proxy 
for various aspects of the institutional and organizational structure of SAIs. 
Almost throughout, these variables are not significant for explaining differences in 
(i) fiscal policy, (ii) government effectiveness and (iii) total factor productivity. 
There is, however, one noteworthy exception: Perceived corruption levels, an 
aspect of government effectiveness, is significantly higher in countries that follow   25 
a court model in the organization of their SAIs, an organizational structure often 
also called the Napoleonic model. 
These results are quite disillusioning. Does this imply that SAIs are indeed 
supremely superfluous as the title of this paper asks? Unfortunately, we are not 
really able to tell as we have delved into analyzing the (economically relevant) 
effects of different institutional and organizational structures of SAIs. To answer 
the more basic question, we would have to contrast countries that do not have any 
audit institutions with those that do. Unfortunately, this is impossible as basically 
all states do have some form of audit organization. Demanding the immediate 
dissolution of SAIs based on these results would, hence, be premature. 
The INTOSAI survey contains some 100 questions. A lot of institutional variation 
has thus been recognized in the various variables. Since the results of both surveys 
are very similar, we dare to call them robust although it would, of course, be a 
desideratum for further studies to increase the number of countries covered by the 
surveys. Although 53 countries are covered by the two surveys used here, a 
broader coverage is certainly desirable, especially since the two surveys cover a 
number of fairly small states and, in turn, do not cover some of the larger 
countries. 
We conjecture that another aspect might be important to look at more closely in 
the future: most of the variables are based on the de jure foundations of SAIs. In a 
number of former studies (e.g. Feld and Voigt 2003 on the judiciary, Voigt, Feld, 
van Aaken 2006 on prosecutors), one key result was that de jure independence 
was often not significant whereas the factual independence of the respective 
agencies was. Unfortunately, the de facto indicator here used (FIND) has a rather 
slim basis as it is exclusively founded on the number of employees of an SAI per 
100 000 inhabitants. If an extension of this study seems desirable at all, a broader 
de facto indicator would be a desideratum. 
   26 
Appendix 1: Coding of the World Bank/OECD-variables 
 
How would external audit arrengements be described? IND
There is no formal external audit of government accounts 0,00
The audit authority reports only within the executive (e.g., to the President) 0,25
The National Audit Body is a legislative body 0,50
A National Audit Body, independent of the executive, audits government 
accounts and reports to the executive.
0,75
A National Audit Body, independent of the executive, audits government 
accounts and reports to the legislature.
1,00
What mandate does the National Audit Body have? MAND*
Attestation of financial accountability of individual agencies 0,20
Attestation of the financial accountability of the government as a whole 0,20
Audit of financial systems, internal control, and audit functions 0,20
A mandate covering performance as well as financial compliance 0,20
Other, please specify 0,20
Is there a system to track audit recommendations once issued? TRAC
No 0,00
Yes, but the reports are kept internally 0,33
Yes, an annual report is issued of recommendations 0,67
Yes, keeps track of implementation of recommendations 1,00
How is the independence of the National Audit Body from the executive 
established?
ARR
It is not clearly set out in law 0,00
It is set out in administrative regulation 0,33
It is established in law 0,67
It is established in the constitution 1,00
How are the subjects of audits determined? SUBJ*
By legislative branch request 0,20
Internally determined 0,20
By executive branch request 0,20
By request from the public or other civil society actor 0,20
Other, please specify 0,20
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Appendix 2: List of Countries 
Country IND MAND TRAC ARR SUBJ FIND MOD
Argentina 0,50 0,80 1,00 0,40
Australia 1,00 0,80 1,00 0,67 0,60
Austria  1,00 0,80 0,67 0,67 0,40 4,05 0,00
Belgium  1,00 0,40 0,33 1,00 0,40
Bolivia  0,25 0,20 1,00 0,67 1,00
Brazil   1,16 1,00
Canada   1,00 1,00 1,00 0,67 0,40 2,11 0,00
Chile    0,60 0,33 1,00 0,80
Colombia 1,00 0,80 0,67 1,00
Costa Rica 17,18 0,00
Cyprus  14,31 0,00
Czech Rep. 1,00 0,40 0,00 0,67 0,80
Denmark  0,50 0,80 1,00 0,67 0,60 5,15 0,00
El Salvador 19,57 1,00
Fiji     7,90 0,00
Finland  1,00 0,80 0,67 1,00 0,20 1,74 0,00
France   1,00 0,20 1,00 1,00 0,20 1,59 1,00
Gambia   5,04 0,00
Germany  1,00 0,80 0,67 1,00 0,20 0,85 0,00
Greece   8,36 1,00
Hungary  1,00 0,80 1,00 1,00 0,60 3,33 0,00
Iceland  1,00 0,80 0,00 0,67 0,60 6,32 0,00
Ireland  1,00 0,80 0,33 1,00 0,20 3,55 0,00
Israel   1,00 1,00 0,67 0,67 0,20
Italy    1,00 0,60 0,00 0,67 0,20 1,00
Japan    1,00 0,20 1,00 1,00 0,40
Malawi   2,41 0,00
Malaysia 6,92 0,00
Mexico   1,00 0,80 1,00 1,00 0,40
Namibia  4,90 0,00
Nepal    2,25 0,00
Netherlands 1,00 0,20 1,00 1,00 0,20 2,14 0,00
New Zeland 1,00 0,20 1,00 0,67 0,20 9,81 0,00
Norway   1,00 0,80 0,00 1,00 0,20 10,11 1,00
Pakistan 0,66 0,00
Papua N.G. 2,45 0,00
Philippines 17,11 1,00
Poland   3,76 0,00
Portugal 0,60 0,67 0,60
Romania  0,11 1,00
Russia   0,10 0,00
Singapor 0,00 0,00
Slovak Rep. 1,00 0,40 1,00 0,80
South Africa 1,00 0,60 0,67 1,00 0,80 2,73 0,00
South Korea 1,00 0,80 1,00 0,67 0,20 1,71 1,00
Spain    1,00 0,60 1,00 1,53 1,00
Sweden   0,75 0,60 0,67 1,00 0,40 5,69 0,00
Switzerland 1,14 0,00
Thailand 3,74 0,00
Turkey   1,00 0,80 1,00 1,00 0,20 0,09 1,00
USA      1,00 1,00 1,00 0,67 0,80 1,96 0,00
UK      1,00 0,60 0,33 0,67 0,20 1,41 0,00
Uruguaya  1,00 0,80 1,00 0,40
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Appendix 3: List of Variables 
Variable  Description  Source 
AVELF  Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 1960. Measures 
probability that two randomly selected people from a given 
country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group 
Persson/Tabellini 2003 ; 
La Porta et al. 1999 
CGEXP  Central government spending (social security included) as a 
percentage of GDP 
Persson/Tabellini 2003 
CPI0004  Average of the Corruption Perception Index 2000-2004 (recorded 
such that 0 stands for perfectly clean and 10 for highly corrupt) 
Transparency Inter-
national 2000-2004 
DEFACTOJI  Index of 9 variables measuring de facto judicial 
independence on a scale of 0-1 
Feld/Voigt 2003 
DEFACTOPI  Index of 6 variables measuring de facto judicial 
independence on a scale of 0-1 
Voigt et al. 2004 




FEDERAL.  Dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if country is a federal 
country, 0 if otherwise 
Persson/Tabellini 2003 ; 
Adserà et al. 2001 
FRAC  Intensity of party competition   Beck et al. 2000 
FRANKROM  Natural log of the Frankel-Romer forecasted trade share, derived 
from a gravity model of international trade 
Persson/Tabellini 2003 
GASTIL  Average of indices for civil liberties and political rights measured 
on a scale from 1 to 7; 1 representing the highest degree 
Persson/Tabellini 2003; 
Freedom House  
GOVEF  Based on a number of survey indicators, this variable is based on 
responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality 
of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the 
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to policies 
Kaufman et al. 2002 
LATITUDE  Absolute value of the Hall/Jones 1999 numbers; divided by 90.  Persson/Tabellini 2003 
LEGOR  Dummies for legal origins; Coded 1 if legal origin is common 
law, french law, german law, scandinavian law, coded 0 if legal 
origin is any other 
La Porta et al. 1999 
LOGA  Calculation based on Hall/Jones 1999 as described in text; more 
recent data from Heston et al. 2002 
Hall/Jones 1999; 
Heston et al. 2002 
LYP  Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita in constant dollars  Persson/Tabellini 2003 
OECD  Dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if country is member of 
the OECD, 0 if otherwise 
Persson/Tabellini 2003 
POLITYIV  Autocracy/Democracy measure that can take on values between 
-10 (complete autocracy) to +10 (complete democracy) 
Persson/Tabellini 2003; 
Polity IV 
PRESS  Press freedom on a scale of 0-100 with 0=completely free   Freedom House 2000 
PROP65  % of the population over the age of 65 in the total populatiuon  Persson/Tabellini 2003 
PROT80  % of the population in a country professing the protestant 
religion in 1980 
Persson/Tabellini 2003; 
La Porta et al. 1998 
SPL  Size of budget surplus of the central government as a percentage 
of GDP 
Persson/Tabellini 2003 
TRADE  Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a 
share of GDP 
Heston et al. (2002) 
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